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Abstract 
The case for taxing financial transactions merely to raise more revenues from the financial 
sector is not particularly strong. Better alternatives to tax the financial sector are likely to be 
available. However, a tax on financial transactions could be justified in order to limit socially 
undesirable transactions when more direct means of doing so are unavailable for political or 
practical reasons. Some financial transactions are indeed likely to do more harm than good, 
especially when they contribute to the systemic risk of the financial system. However, such a 
financial transaction tax should be very small, much smaller than the negative externalities in 
question, because it is a blunt instrument that also drives out socially useful transactions. 
There is a case for taxing over-the-counter derivative transactions at a somewhat higher rate 
than exchange-based derivative transactions. More targeted remedies to drive out socially 
undesirable transactions should be sought in parallel, which would allow, after their 
implementation, to reduce or even phase out financial transaction taxes.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
The volume of financial transactions has grown very rapidly in the past decade 
reaching about 70 times world GDP. The crisis has dented but not reversed this 
growth while greatly increasing the public support for taxing financial transactions.  
Aim  
The key question of this paper is: Should financial transactions be taxed?  
 
The case for a tax on financial transactions simply to raise more revenue from the 
financial sector to pay for the cost of the crisis is not particularly strong. Better 
alternatives to tax the financial sector are likely to be available.  
 
However, the case for a tax on financial transactions in order to limit negative 
externalities of financial transactions is stronger. Some financial transactions are 
indeed likely to do more harm than good, especially when they contribute to the 
systemic risk of the financial system. To the extent that more direct means of curbing 
harmful transactions are presently unavailable, the introduction of a financial 
transaction tax should be considered. 
 
However, such a financial transaction tax should be very small, much smaller than the 
negative externalities in question, because it is a blunt instrument that also drives out 
socially useful transactions. At the same time, there is a case for taxing over-the-
counter derivative transactions at a somewhat higher rate than exchange-based 
derivative transactions. Countries that currently levy relatively substantial transactions 
taxes on specific segments of the market may wish to harmonise and therefore lower 
their rates to a globally agreed level. 
 
More targeted remedies to drive out socially undesirable transactions should be sought 
in parallel. As targeted remedies are implemented, financial transaction taxes should 
be reduced or even phased out. Thereby, the financial transaction tax could provide 
the financial industry with an incentive to embrace such targeted remedies even as the 
memory of the financial crisis fades. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial transaction taxes, just like other taxes, essentially do two things: first, they raise 
revenue and, second, they reduce the activity that is being taxed. The reason that financial 
transaction taxes are rapidly gaining political traction is that they would appear attractive on 
both counts in the current post-crisis situation.  
 
Revenue raising: Faced with greatly increased debt levels, governments are keen to raise 
additional revenues, if possible from the financial sector, which has contributed to the current 
global economic and financial crisis and had to be bailed out. The political idea here is to 
make those who caused the crisis foot at least part of the bill. 
 
Reducing the taxed activity: As a result of the crisis, confidence in the efficiency of financial 
markets has weakened. Experts and the general public are questioning the social usefulness of 
the rapid growth in financial transaction volumes observed in the past few years. Hence, many 
no longer regard the prospect of a financial transaction tax somewhat reducing transaction 
volumes as a great concern, and some explicitly welcome the prospect, regarding financial 
transactions at the current level as positively harmful.  
 
According to a recent UK poll (see Box 1), public support for financial transaction taxes is 
indeed increasing. And, at the recent EU summit in December 2009, European leaders 
explicitly encouraged the IMF to consider the introduction of a global financial transaction 
tax.1  
 
Box 1: A recent UK opinion poll on financial transaction taxes 
In early November 2009, Oxfam commissioned a YouGov poll on the support for financial 
transaction taxes in the UK, a few weeks after Gordon Brown had called for the globally 
coordinated introduction of such taxes. Figure 1 gives the support level for financial 
transaction taxes, and Figure 2 gives the support for different measures to consolidate the UK 
budget, including taxes on financial transactions.  
 
Figure 1: Support for transaction tax
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1 “The European Council emphasises the importance of renewing the economic and social contract between 
financial institutions and the society they serve and of ensuring that the public benefits in good times and is 
protected from risk. The European Council encourages the IMF to consider the full range of options including 
insurance fees, resolution funds, contingent capital arrangements and a global financial transaction levy in its 
review.” Conclusions of the European Council (10-11 December 2009), paragraph 15. 
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But despite these endorsements, the question remains whether financial transaction taxes 
really make sense. Intellectually, the idea to introduce financial transaction taxes goes back to 
John Maynard Keynes (1936) and James Tobin. In 1972, the latter proposed introducing a tax 
specifically on international foreign-exchange transactions that would act like soft capital 
controls by throwing “grains of sand in the wheels of the market” (Tobin 1974), thereby 
enhancing the policy space for national fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
But today, only a limited number of countries are using financial transaction taxes, including 
the UK. Perhaps the critics are right in arguing that the negative side effects of financial 
transaction taxes simply outweigh any benefits such taxes might entail? After presenting some 
basic facts about the current volume of financial transactions and the international experience 
with transaction taxes in section 2, we explore this key question in some detail in section 3 of 
this paper. Section 4 concludes and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
 
2.  SOME FACTS: FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION TAXES 
Before we enter into the arguments for and against financial transaction taxes in more detail, 
it is helpful to look at the amount of financial transactions and the impact of the crisis on 
trading and open derivative positions. To this end, we report available aggregate data on the 
evolution of financial-transaction volumes and briefly discuss the experience with financial 
transaction taxes in a number of countries.  
2.1. Financial transaction volumes 
Financial transaction volumes have increased dramatically in recent years. Figure 3 presents 
data on annual turnover for the main spot and derivatives markets as a ratio of world GDP.2 In 
2007, total turnover amounted to almost 70 times world GDP. The lion’s share of 
transactions, 88 percent in 2007, is accounted for by derivatives trading, of which trading 
related to fixed-income securities features prominently. Spot transactions only amount to 
about 12 percent of all transactions. 
 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately data on turnover and open positions are not fully comparable across various markets and hence 
Figure 3 should be interpreted with some caution.  
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Figure 3: Annual turnover on main financial markets  
(World GDP = 1, 1995-2007) 
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Source: BIS, WFE, IMF. 
Note. ET=exchange traded; OTC=over the counter; OTC derivatives turnover data and spot-currency turnover 
data are based on the BIS triennial survey conducted in April of every third year. We multiplied by 250 the April 
daily average value to get an estimate of annual turnover. Turnover data for commodity markets is not available. 
 
Higher-quality data is available at quarterly intervals for exchange-traded derivatives 
(excluding commodity markets). Figure 4 presents turnover data (in US dollars) for the three 
main types of derivatives broken down by geographic region where available. The key 
observation from the figure is that there was an explosion of trading activity starting in the 
early 2000s. The crisis shrunk trading activity by almost one half: turnover in 2009Q1 was 53 
percent of turnover in 2008Q1. By 2010Q1 trading had rebounded somewhat to 75 percent of 
the peak level of 2008Q1, which is still several times more than the market activity levels 
before 2000. 
 
Figure 4: Quarterly turnover in exchange-traded derivatives  
(USD Trillion, 1986Q1-2010Q1) 
INTEREST RATES
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
U
SD
 T
ri
lli
on
s
World Total
US
Europe
Asia-Pacific
Other
EQUITY
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
U
SD
 T
ri
lli
o
ns
World Total
US
Europe
Asia-Pacific
Other
CURRENCY
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
U
SD
 T
ri
lli
o
ns
Total
Futures
Options
 
Source: BIS. 
Note. Quarterly data is available only since 1993 and hence one quarter of annual values are shown at each 
quarter before  
 
In addition to the turnover data, we also provide an overview of the stock of open positions 
for derivative contracts. Figure 5 shows net open positions at quarterly intervals for exchange-
traded derivatives, whereas data for over-the-counter derivatives is only available on a gross 
basis (Figure 6). Open positions move broadly in line with the changes in turnover. The 
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explosion in open positions since the early 2000s, the crisis-related sharp drop and the partial 
rebound after the first quarter of 2009 are clearly discernible.  
 
Figure 5: Net open positions for exchange-traded derivatives 
(USD trillion, 1986Q1-2010Q1) 
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Source: BIS. 
Note. Quarterly data is available only since 1993 and hence the end-of-year values are shown at each quarter 
before. 
 
Figure 6: Gross open positions of over-the-counter derivatives  
(USD trillion, 1998 – 2009; biannual data) 
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Source: BIS. 
Note. Values shown are notional amounts outstanding. 
 
One important question for our purposes is the nature of transactions behind the observed 
explosion in activity, and to some extent also the reasons for the observed sharp drop in 
response to the crisis. The development of market infrastructure, and especially improvements 
in information technologies – which substantially decreased transaction costs - and parallel 
financial innovation creating a large variety of derivatives products were certainly 
 8
prerequisites for the observed developments. But it is unlikely that these factors alone fully 
explain the huge explosion in trading as shown in eg Figure 4.3 
 
There are basically two views regarding the nature of the explosion in transactions from about 
2000 to 2008. One view is that lower transaction costs simply enabled markets to process 
information much more efficiently and in real time thereby greatly increasing activity levels. 
Short-term speculation and the parallel increase in the liquidity made markets much more 
efficient than before. The other view is that a rather large share of the additional trading 
activity is the consequence of anomalies in financial markets. Some call it ‘excessive short 
term speculation’, others draw attention to flawed incentives4, partly due to implicit 
government insurance, while others argue that the excessively low interest-rate policy of 
major developed countries since about 2000 has fuelled the expansion of money and credit 
with subsequent asset-price booms that further fuelled trading activity.  
 
What is clear is that the pace of expansion of trading activity significantly outperformed the 
pace of expansion in economic activity, which is clearly evident from Figure 3 relating 
financial-market turnover to GDP. But GDP is a flow concept, and it would have been 
informative to relate transactions to the stock of financial assets. Unfortunately there exist no 
readily available global statistics on this, but available evidence suggests that that annual 
turnover amounts to twentyfold or more the stock of financial assets. For example, the bulk, ie 
64 percent, of financial transactions in 2007 were derivatives related to fixed- income 
products. According to BIS data, the total notional amounts outstanding of all international 
and domestic debt securities (of financial institutions, corporate issuers and governments), 
plus money-market instruments, were 27 trillion US dollars in 1995 and 80 trillion in 2007 
world wide. Derivatives trading related to fixed-income securities amounted to 345 trillion in 
1995 and 2403 trillion in 2007. Hedging and distribution of interest-rate risk may not be 
related solely to fixed-income securities, but also to credit. There are no readily available 
statistics on world credit, but its stock may be between 100 percent and 200 percent of world 
GDP, which was 55 trillion in 2007. Adding the stock of credit to the stock of fixed-income 
securities, the resulting sum is still a tiny fraction of the 2840 trillion fixed-income related 
annual derivatives trading. Furthermore, the bulk of fixed-income derivatives trading (1981 
trillion out of 2403 trillion in 2007) was conducted on organised exchanges, and hence the 
‘hot-potato’ effect often argued for dealership markets, such as the foreign-exchange market, 
may not be able to explain the huge rise in transactions. 
 
Obviously, fixed-income derivatives are related not just to the underlying fixed-income 
security and credit, but also to hedging other activities. For example, the hedging of future 
foreign-currency risks also has an interest rate dimension that can be addressed with interest-
rates swaps. Interest-rate swaps are also the ideal means to pursue “long duration” investment 
strategies by insurance companies and others. Various interest-rate derivatives are also used 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to measure transaction costs, not least because different investors face different transaction costs 
even from the same financial intermediary. Appendix 2 of Darvas (2009) presents transaction-costs data on the 
inter-dealer currency market for major currencies and reports that costs halved from the 1980s to the 2000s in the 
case of several currency pairs.  
4 In 2002, ie well before the crisis, Warren Buffett, who is one of the most successful investors in history and in 
2008 was ranked by Forbes as the richest person in the world,  has raised serious concerns about the incentives 
of market participants working with derivatives and specifically warned about the explosion in derivatives: “The 
derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and 
number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Central banks and governments have so far found no 
effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts. In my view, derivatives are financial 
weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.” 
 to hedge asset-backed securities and, as their duration can change easily, it may be needed to 
change the hedging positions frequently. While these and other hedging activities are 
generally essential to manage risk, the huge gap between turnover and the outstanding stock 
of assets still presents a puzzle. 
 
Overall, lower transaction costs and financial innovation have clearly helped markets to be 
more efficient at helping actors follow through their economic incentives, thereby leading to 
massive increases in financial-transaction volumes. However, what is less clear is the extent 
to which the relevant actors were all acting in accordance with sound incentives, which 
ultimately determines the extent to which this increase in transactions was accompanied by a 
real increase in economic efficiency. 
 
2.2. Financial transaction taxes: international experiences 
Many countries have applied financial transaction taxes in the past and a limited number of 
countries continue to apply financial transaction taxes today. These taxes are primarily levied 
on spot share trading, but in a few countries other types of transactions, including derivatives, 
are taxed as well5. The best-known example is the UK’s stamp duty: it is a 0.5 percent tax on 
the value of spot transactions in shares of UK companies. The tax rate on share trading is 1 
percent in Ireland, 0.5 percent in Korea, while tax rates between 0.15 and 0.3 percent are 
applied in Australia, Switzerland, Greece, Hong Kong, India and Taiwan.6 The Taiwanese 
transaction tax is rather broad and covers various kinds of securities, including bonds and 
futures contracts (see Box 2). The revenue generated from the tax can be substantial, with 
data for the UK, Ireland, Taiwan and South Africa provided in Table 1. 
 
 
 
5
a
6
bBox 2: Financial transaction tax rates and bases in Taiwan 
Taiwan provides an interesting example, because it has FTTs on both spot and derivatives 
markets. 
 
Securities transaction tax: 
0.3% for shares or share certificates embodying the right to shares issued by companies.  
0.1% for corporate bonds and other securities approved by the government (note: the 
Taiwanese government has recently suspended the tax on bond transactions until the end of 
2016).  
 
Futures transaction tax: 
Different rates apply depending on type of contract:  
 - between 0.0000125% and 0.06% per transaction on the value of stock index futures 
contracts,  
 - between 0.0000125% and 0.00025% per transaction on the value of contracts for interest 
rates,  
 - between 0.1% and 0.6% per transaction for options based on premium paid,  
 - between 0.0000125% and 0.06% per transaction on the value for other futures contracts 9
 
                                                
 See, for example, Table 1 in Pollin, Baker and Schaberg 2003, and Table A1 in Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller 
nd Picek, 2008 
 France also had a tax rate between 0.15 and 0.30 percent with a maximum of 610 euros for each transaction, 
ut it was abolished on 1 January 2008.  
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The collection cost of FTTs is generally very low due to the electronic execution and 
settlement of trades. In the UK, for example, the collection costs for all kinds of stamp duties 
(including on property) cost 0.21 pence per pound raised in the fiscal year 2008/2009, while 
the average for all taxes amounted to 1.10 pence (HM Revenue & Customs Autumn 
Performance Report 2009). But the collection costs for stamp duty on share transactions is 
likely to be substantially lower still since the number given above includes collection costs for 
stamp duty on property, typically more expensive to collect (Bond, Hawkins and Klemm 
2005). 
 
 
Table 1: Revenues from financial transaction taxes in four countries (2001-2009) 
  UK Ireland Taiwan South Africa 
  
in 
GBP 
bn  
% of total 
tax 
revenues 
in 
EUR 
bn  
% of total 
tax 
revenues 
in 
USD 
bn 
% of total 
tax 
revenues 
in 
USD 
bn 
% of total 
tax 
revenues 
2001 2.9 0.9 0.35 1.2 1.9 5.2 0.4 1.6 
2002 2.6 0.8 0.30 1.0 2.3 6.5 0.4 1.6 
2003 2.6 0.7 0.26 0.8 2.2 5.9 0.6 1.6 
2004 2.7 0.7 0.26 0.7 2.8 6.7 1.0 2.1 
2005 3.5 0.9 0.32 0.8 2.3 4.8 1.3 2.4 
2006 3.8 0.9 0.41 0.9 2.9 5.9 1.5 2.5 
2007 4.2 0.9 0.61 1.3 4.1 7.8 1.4 1.9 
2008 3.2 0.7 0.42 1.0 3.0 5.5 1.4 1.9 
2009 n.a. n.a. 0.21 0.6 3.3 7.2 n.a. n.a. 
Sources: HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue Irish Tax & Customs, Ministry of Finance (ROC), South Africa 
Revenue Services, IFS. 
Note. UK data refer to fiscal year. 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that transaction taxes have not been equally successful in 
collecting revenues everywhere. For example, when Sweden introduced a financial 
transaction tax in the mid-eighties, the revenues were disappointing, not least because the tax 
was easily avoided as financial dealings were moved abroad. The extent to which this is 
possible depends crucially on the specific design of the financial transaction tax. The UK 
stamp duty, for example, essentially buys legal certainty. Only once the tax is paid has the 
transfer of ownership been officially stamped.  Of course, in the UK case it is still possible to 
sell a share to a counterparty abroad so that it leaves the UK system and can thereafter change 
hands without being subject to the UK’s stamp duty. However, a transaction that exits the 
system in that way is in effect charged at 3 times the normal stamp duty, thereby to some 
extent inoculating the system against geographic relocation of transactions.  
 
3. SHOULD FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BE TAXED? 
The evidence presented in the previous section shows that financial transactions have indeed 
exploded in a considerable number of countries and suggests that taxing financial transaction 
remains possible in a global financial market, although the practical experience with taxing 
derivatives - the most rapidly growing segment of financial transactions - is limited.  
 
Against this background we can now turn to the key policy question of this paper: should 
financial transactions be taxed? 
 
 11
From a public-finance perspective, taxes should essentially be collected for either of two 
reasons that are not mutually exclusive: to collect revenues for public expenditures and to 
discourage activities that are deemed to have negative side effects not properly taken into 
account by market participants. Taxes levied at least in part for the latter motive of 
‘internalising negative externalities’ are called Pigou taxes after Artur Cecil Pigou, a British 
economist who proposed such taxes to correct market failures.  
 
In the following, we will argue that the case for a financial transaction tax purely on the 
grounds of raising revenues is relatively weak, while the case for a financial transaction tax as 
a Pigou tax is more convincing. 
 
3.1. Revenue-raising taxation 
From a pure revenue-raising perspective, the case for a financial transaction tax is not 
particularly strong. The reason is that a large part of financial transactions should be regarded 
as ‘intermediate production’, not final consumption. Interest rates swaps, for example, can be 
a useful hedging tool in the production process but are not normally enjoyed as final 
consumer products. 
 
Generally, financial markets are supposed to allocate two key factors of production, capital 
and risk, to the production process. To the extent that they do so efficiently, taxation of such 
intermediate steps of production should typically be avoided as it is prone to distort 
production efficiency (Diamond and Mirlees 1971).7  
But how does this observation square with the three key arguments often used to support the 
revenue-raising rationale of taxing financial transactions? : (1) the financial sector is 
undertaxed compared to other sectors and the transaction tax would remedy this problem; (2) 
the transaction tax should raise revenues from the financial sector, amounting in effect to an 
‘insurance fee’ for the systemic risk created by the financial sector; (3) the revenue collected 
could be used for global purposes given otherwise scarce resources, such as to fund 
development assistance or global public goods like climate change. In our view, none of these 
three arguments are built on sufficiently solid ground. 
 
3.1.1. Undertaxation of the financial sector 
It is true that the financial sector is difficult to tax. In part this is the case because financial-
sector organisations may find it comparatively easy to shift profits internationally. Another 
important factor is that the financial sector is essentially exempt from value added taxation. 
The absence of VAT on financial products is, perhaps ironically, attributable to technical 
difficulties in appropriately measuring the value added in financial-sector products. As a 
result, the use of financial services by private households, for example the borrowing of 
money as a mortgage, is currently VAT exempt, contrary to, say, the renting of a car which is 
subject to VAT. However, to address such problems it may be preferable, in view of the 
distortive nature of transaction taxes (see above) to increase taxation of the financial industry 
directly. This could be achieved through an enhanced regime for taxing profits, dividends and 
bonuses and through steps to at least partially include the financial sector in the VAT regime.8 
One would thereby avoid the problem of taxing intermediate production. Also, one would not 
                                                 
7 If, however, financial markets are allocating capital and risk inefficiently to start with, then the Diamond-
Mirlees result does not apply as discussed in the subsequent section on Pigou taxation.  
8 Huzinga (2002) makes a concrete proposal on how to introduce VAT for financial-sector services purchased by 
private households. 
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have to worry about an important unknown, namely the incidence of financial transaction 
taxes. At this stage, we still do not have a very good idea which part of the financial 
transaction taxes would end up being paid by the financial sector – its shareholders, managers 
and employees – and which part would end up being paid by the rest of society.  
 
3.1.2. Insurance fee 
If such a fee is to be raised, then it should of course be collected in the way that causes the 
least distortion. However, because of the finding by Diamond and Mirlees cited above, it is 
indeed questionable whether from a purely revenue-raising perspective the transaction tax 
would be the best way to collect such fees. And viable alternatives should exist, as explained 
in the previous paragraph. 
 
3.1.3. Raising revenues for development assistance or global public goods 
Regarding the idea to raise revenues for development assistance or global public goods 
through transaction taxes, we are also somewhat sceptical. The public finance perspective 
simply offers little support for such goals. The reason is that earmarking of revenues of a 
particular tax for specific purposes risks the misallocation of public funds: either too much or 
too little money might be spent on the specific purpose chosen just because the revenues from 
the tax in question were lower or higher than the optimum level of spending. In order to avoid 
such misallocation, tax revenues should by default be used to fund the general budget so that 
the expenditure allocation can be optimised on the basis of the overall tax resources that are 
available, including those resources spent on global concerns. What is more, it should be 
noted that revenues from financial transaction taxes would be very unevenly distributed 
geographically, with the lion’s share accruing to a limited number of financial centres. Within 
the EU, tax revenues would be extremely concentrated in the UK and Germany, where over 
97 percent of EU spot and derivate transactions are currently taking place (see eg 
Schulmeister et al 2008). This makes it particularly unlikely that the UK or Germany would 
agree to fund worthwhile international activities in proportion to transaction tax revenues.  
 
In summary, we are somewhat sceptical at the suggestion that financial transaction taxes 
should be introduced with the primary objective of raising revenue.  
 
3.2. Pigou taxation 
By contrast, we do see some merit in the case for a small financial transaction tax as a Pigou 
tax if financial transactions indeed cause negative external effects that need to be internalised.  
 
To start with, it may be worth re-stating the well-known case for a Pigou tax in the case of a 
negative externality like environmental pollution. Without Pigou taxes on the polluting 
activity, too much polluting would occur. Banning polluting activities altogether typically 
does not make sense since zero pollution would make the world very clean but also very poor. 
What we typically want is simply to lower pollution so that the marginal benefit of the 
activity equals the marginal pollution cost. To achieve this, regulation might sometimes be an 
alternative to Pigou taxation, but it has two disadvantages. First, it would mean foregoing the 
revenues of the Pigou taxes, revenues that would then have to be raised through other taxes 
that cause undesirable distortions. Second, regulators would often be faced with the difficult 
administrative choice about who should be polluting and by how much. To avoid that 
problem, the state could of course sell pollution certificates, but in many ways that would be 
the exact economic equivalent of a Pigou tax.  
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Next, the question arises whether financial transactions may actually be accompanied by 
negative externalities, in which case a Pigou tax would help. In parallel, we explore reasons 
why a Pigou tax would hurt.  
 
3.2.1. Excessive incentives to be faster than others 
One fairly solid argument why there may be too much investment in financial market 
infrastructure was developed by Stiglitz (1988). It is based on the observation that it will 
always pay to have new information faster than other market participants and then to trade on 
it. This provides a powerful private incentive heavily to invest in being – perhaps just a 
millisecond – faster. This is very much the reality in financial centres today, with heavy 
infrastructure investments in very fast ‘high-frequency trading’ by major market players9.  
 
While many private investments in information gathering and processing for private gain also 
serve the general public by making markets better at absorbing information, it is plausible that 
these ‘arms-race incentives’ may produce ‘too much of a good thing’. An illustrative example 
for such over-investment might be a recent USD 1.3 billion project to lay an optical cable 
through the Arctic Sea between the financial centers in London and Tokyo. The cable would 
cut latency times for data transmission from 140 to 88 milliseconds which appears to be the 
principal selling point for the financial sector.10  
 
A financial transaction tax could help to reduce such over-incentives to invest in being fastest 
by discouraging very short-term speculation that exploits minor information advantages. 
While this overinvestment is likely to be only a tiny fraction of GDP, it may not be an entirely 
negligible part of investment of the financial service industry. 
 
3.2.2. Regulation and financial-sector fragility 
A powerful argument in favour of transaction taxes would of course emerge if very low 
transaction costs could be linked to the kind of financial sector instability we have just been 
through. Krugman (2009) gives an example of such a link: part of the fragility of the financial 
sector observed during the present crisis was due to the heavy reliance on short-term 
arrangements and, more broadly, excessive systemically relevant leverage. For example, the 
financial sector relied to a large extent on rather short-term financing for its funding needs 
(interbank market, commercial paper). When the market for this short-term funding broke 
down, the situation immediately became systemically relevant and public intervention was 
needed. A financial transaction tax might have helped somewhat to discourage such short-
term arrangements. However, as pointed out by Zingales (2009), a tax on short-term debt 
would be a better instrument to tackle this particular concern. 
 
But behind this particular example there might be a more general observation on the interplay 
between financial-sector regulation and financial-market efficiency. If financial- sector 
regulation is sufficiently light to allow substantial financial innovation, the chances are that it 
will be periodically outsmarted by the financial industry, at a cost to the general public. And it 
is at least plausible that very low transaction costs facilitate the thorough exploitation of even 
relatively minor regulatory shortcomings. Put differently: transporting tomato ketchup in a 
leaky (regulatory) bucket may not be a big problem, but transporting water is another matter.  
                                                 
9 ‘Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds’, New York Times, 23 July 2009. 
10 ‘Global warming opens Arctic for Tokyo-London undersea cable’, Associated Press, 21 January 2010. 
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Hopefully, the now obvious and gaping holes in our regulatory bucket are being mended in 
the aftermath of the crisis. This should include a more through treatment of the problem of 
systemic risk as we currently understand it and the externalities implied by it. Some highly 
problematic practices or products might even have to be banned. However, historical 
experience suggests that such regulatory improvements are usually successful at preventing a 
repeat crisis, they are unlikely to be flawless as witnessed by new types of crisis that emerge.  
 
Aspects of regulation which we may consider too small to be important today may suddenly 
matter a great deal as markets become ever-more efficient and find new ways to exploit 
regulatory loopholes. Therefore, transaction taxes may be justified given the uncertainties 
about future regulatory problems. And they might, from time to time, even be able to give 
regulators a little more time to think about the holes to be plugged.  
 
In a sense, this argument is just a variant of the well-known insight that if there is one 
inefficiency in your system – in this case imperfect regulation – then more efficiency in the 
rest of the system could be a bad thing. However, it need not be. In sum, this particular 
argument in favour of a financial transaction tax is potentially very important, but it is also 
somewhat fragile. But it is probably fair to say that the crisis has shifted the burden of proof 
somewhat. Before the crisis many people felt that regulatory imperfections were not an 
essential part of the picture. This certainly has changed and there are few signs of regulatory 
hubris re-emerging arguing that new regulation will deal with any such problems once and for 
all. 
 
3.2.3. Taxation versus controls 
Possibly of lesser relevance for the current debate but of interest anyway may be the original 
proposal for a financial transaction tax on currency trades by Tobin (1974, 1978). His was in 
essence a proposal in the context of the ‘holy trinity’ of monetary independence, fixed 
exchange rates and capital mobility. His proposed tax would essentially have acted like a soft 
form of capital controls, thereby increasing the autonomy of the national government and 
central bank to manage the business cycle without destabilising the exchange rate. While the 
underlying problem is of course still relevant today for a number of countries, it may be hard 
to justify the introduction of a universal transaction tax on that basis. However, what remains 
is the insight that transaction taxes may often be an attractive policy when administrative 
zero-one choices are inappropriate, as may be the case with many problems in the financial 
markets.  
 
3.2.4. Transaction costs and volatility 
One much-discussed question is whether lower financial transaction costs lead to lower or 
higher price volatility in markets. However, the brief review of the literature we present in the 
following is inconclusive. Therefore, we would be hesitant to use a possible link between 
financial transaction costs and volatility either as a strong argument for or against financial 
transaction taxes at this stage.  
 
Advocates of financial transaction taxes suggest that by making short-horizon trading more 
costly compared to long-horizon trading, both short-run volatility (ie ‘noise’) and long-run 
volatility (ie persistent deviation from ‘fundamental equilibrium’) would lessen; see eg 
Summers and Summers (1989), Frankel (1996), Palley (2003) or Schulmeister (2009). On the 
other hand, there is also the opposite argument that financial transaction taxes, by reducing 
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liquidity, risk increasing the volatility of markets; see eg Mannaro, Marchesi and Stzu (2008). 
The empirical evidence on this appears inconclusive at this point. For example, Jones and 
Seguin (1997) show that the reduction in the commission portion of transaction costs in 1975 
led to a decrease in volatility of stock prices in the US, but Liu and Zhu (2009) – by applying 
the same methodology as Jones and Seguin (1997) – find that a reduction of the commission 
in the Japanese equity markets has increased volatility. Hau (2006) finds a positive 
association between transaction costs and volatility in the French stock market, Baltagi, Li 
and Li (2006) for the Chinese stock market, and Aliber, Chowdhry and Yan (2004) for the 
foreign-exchange market. Yet there are also many papers claiming that transaction taxes (or 
transaction costs more generally) have no significant effect on volatility: Saportan and Kan 
(1997) support this finding for the UK equity market, Hu (1998) for stock markets in Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and Chou and Wang (2006) for the Taiwanese futures 
markets.11  
 
We close this discussion about a possible link between volatility and transaction costs with a 
simple comparison of stock-market volatility for countries with and without financial 
transaction taxes, see Figure 7, which at least does not offer evidence of a very strong cross-
country link between volatility and the taxation of transactions. 
 
Figure 7: Daily stock market volatility, 1996-2009 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from DataStream.  
Note. For each year between 1996 and 2009 we calculated the standard deviation of daily percentage stock-price 
index changes and then calculated the average of these annual figures. Countries with current tax rates between 
0.15 and 1.0 percent are indicated with arrows. 
 
                                                 
11 FISCO (2006) also finds that the debate on the impact of transaction taxes on volatility is inconclusive, and 
discusses in detail several examples from the EU. 
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3.2.5. Trading volume 
By contrast, what is fairly clear is that higher transaction costs will tend to reduce trading 
volume. Such a reduction in trading volume would also tend to go hand in hand with a 
reduction in market liquidity, which could be a major adverse consequence of a tax. What is 
less clear is how large this effect will be. Figure 8 shows the ratio of turnover to market 
capitalisation (a measure called ‘stock-market velocity’). It shows that countries with 
significant transaction taxes do not have exceptionally low stock-market velocities. This 
certainly suggests that the financial transaction tax itself is not the dominant determinant of 
trading activity, with other factors driving major cross-country differences. Those factors 
would include other sources of transaction cost, the size and frequency of shocks to these 
markets and the ways in which these shocks are absorbed.  
 
Figure 8: Stock-market velocity 
(Ratio of annual turnover to market capitalisation, average of 2003-3009) 
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Source: WFE.  
Note. Velocity of NASDAQ is 5.1, but for better readability of the left-hand side panel, it has a 2.0 cut-off. 
Countries with current tax rates between 0.15 and 1.0 percent are indicated with arrows. 
 
3.2.6. Increased cost of funding for the real economy 
But probably the most obvious and direct argument against transaction taxes is that they 
would increase the cost of funding for the real economy via the stock market. While the 
precise extent to which this would occur remains unclear, there exists some literature studying 
this effect. For example, Umlauf (1993) finds that a one-percent tax on share trading in 
Sweden led to a fall in stock prices by 2.2 percent on announcement of the measure. 
According to that study, the cumulative fall in stock prices might even have been as high as 5 
percent when the period prior to the announcement is taken into account. By contrast, Oxera 
(2007) calculates much more marked effects using a stylised model that seeks to estimate the 
net present value of future transaction tax obligations for UK-listed companies. On that basis, 
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the study suggests that the 0.5-percent tax in the UK would be depressing stock prices by as 
much at 8 to 12 percent12. 
 
In a simple version of this simulation approach, the calculated impact depends essentially on 
the stock-market velocity, which varies considerably across different markets, as shown in 
Figure 8. For example, if the stock market-velocity is one, with each stock on average being 
turned over once per year, a 0.5-percent tax amounts to a financial burden of 0.5 percent of 
stock-market capitalisation per year. If this burden is repeated every year, and assuming an 
interest rate of, say, 4 percent, the net present value of the burden would amount to a towering 
12.5 percent of the value of the stock.  
 
Of course, with the much smaller tax rates that we suggest as more appropriate in the 
following, the burden would be proportionately smaller. For example, for a 0.01-percent tax 
rate, the net present value of the transaction tax burden - even for German stocks with a stock-
market velocity of about 1.8 - would amount to a mere 0.45 percent.  
 
3.3. Why a financial transaction tax should be small 
Given the possible advantages of taxing some and the disadvantages of taxing other 
transactions, the first-best solution would of course be to use targeted instruments to deal with 
any negative externalities, while leaving those with no externalities untouched. However, 
assuming for now that only a uniform transaction-tax instrument is available, the pros and 
cons discussed above raise the difficult question of how to manage the trade-off. In the 
transaction-tax debate, this trade-off is traditionally operated by simple assertion and counter-
assertion, which tends not to be very illuminating.  
 
Instead, we offer in the following a fairly robust a-priori argument for why the optimal 
financial transaction tax should be small – much smaller than the externalities in question – 
but not zero.  
 
The reason for this lies in the geometry of the welfare losses and gains caused by the tax. In 
Figure 9a, the welfare loss induced by such a small tax t is depicted for all those transactions 
which do not imply a negative externality. This welfare loss, represented by the red area, 
increases and decreases in proportion to the square of the small tax t. The reason is that one 
side of this triangle is equal to the small tax t itself. And the height of the triangle, viewed 
from that side, varies with the price elasticity of demand, which is also proportional to t.  
 
                                                 
12 In support of this approach, Bond, Hawkins and Klemm (2005) find empirically that more heavily traded 
stocks tended to be impacted more by a change in transaction tax in the UK, though the magnitude of the 
estimated effect is rather small.  
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Figure 9a: Welfare effect of a small tax in the absence of an externality 
 
 
By contrast, the positive welfare effect of a small transaction tax where a negative externality 
is present is depicted as the blue area of Figure 9b. To understand this figure, it should first be 
noted that the externality is depicted here as diminishing social demand for the good. The 
quantity chosen by the market is defined by the point where supply equals private demand. By 
contrast, the socially optimal quantity is substantially lower, defined by the point where 
supply equals social demand. At the original market outcome, the marginal damage done to 
welfare is exactly equal to the size of the negative externality which is represented by the 
maximum height of the blue area. In our calculation we can take it to be constant for small t. 
13 At the same time, the width of the blue area is the variation in the quantity demanded in 
response to the small tax t, which is again proportionate to the price elasticity of t and 
therefore proportionate to t. As a result, the overall size of the blue area varies in proportion to 
t for small tax rates.  
 
                                                 
13 To be precise, the average height decreases as t increases, but this simply adds a negative term in t squared to 
the first order term in t in the formula for the blue area. This term in t squared can then be neglected for small t 
for the remainder of the argument. 
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Figure 9b: Welfare effect of a small tax in the presence of a negative externality 
 
 
With this, we can now show that is it always possible to pick a small but non-zero tax which 
is sufficiently small for the welfare benefits of the tax to exceed the welfare costs. Formally, 
we look for the range of taxes where the blue area is bigger than the red area.  
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Of course, the scale of the drawings in Figure 9a and 9b might in reality be very different, for 
example if there were only very few transactions that carried a negative externality but very 
many carrying a positive one. However, such a difference in scales would merely influence 
the constants above and call for an even smaller t, but the basic result would be unaltered. 
Within this very basic framework – which can be generalised further - we therefore find that a 
range of positive but small financial transaction taxes will always exist that would lead to a 
welfare improvement14.  
 
The intuition for this finding is that a very small tax will only prevent very marginally useful 
‘good’ transactions while at the same time driving out ‘intra-marginally’ and therefore 
significantly ‘bad’ transactions. Therefore, the welfare gain from driving out these bad 
                                                 
14 The most important hidden assumption underlying this result is that financial transactions either exert a 
negative externality or no externality at all. Logically, there also exists the possibility for financial transactions to 
imply a positive externality. Obviously, when both positive and negative externalities are present, little can be 
said about the sign of the tax. However, at least at this stage transactions with positive externalities do not 
feature prominently in the transaction-tax debate. 
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transactions will initially dominate. Using an analogous argument it can also be seen why it 
would not be optimal to fully internalise the externality by setting the Pigou tax at the level of 
the negative externality. The reason for this is that when the Pigou tax is already close to the 
level of the negative externality, further increases will only drive out marginally ‘bad’ 
transactions while driving out significantly useful ‘good transactions’.  
 
It is worth noting that this logic in favour of a small Pigou tax on financial transactions 
applies irrespective of whether short-term or long-term transactions are more likely to carry a 
negative externality. To the extent that there are reasons to believe that short-term speculative 
transactions are more likely to imply a negative externality, the optimal small Pigou tax will 
be just a little higher.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we find that there is a case to be made in favour of a small Pigouvian financial 
transaction tax. However, it should be substantially smaller than the externalities in question. 
To address tax avoidance through financial innovation or geographic relocation, the full range 
of financial transactions – including derivatives – should be included and the introduction of 
the tax should be globally coordinated to the extent possible. 
 
If such a globally coordinated, very small but broad-based financial transactions tax were to 
be implemented, countries that currently levy relatively substantial transactions taxes on 
specific segments of the market, in particular on stock transactions, may wish to harmonise 
and therefore lower their rates to the globally agreed level in order to minimise distortions. 
 
However, we also find that such an optimal financial transaction tax can only be expected to 
very partially internalise any negative external effects. Therefore, more targeted remedies for 
the inefficiencies in question should in any event be sought in parallel to introduction of the 
tax. To the extent that such targeted remedies are available and implemented, any financial 
transaction tax might eventually be reduced or even phased out. In that sense, the financial 
transaction tax might provide the financial industry with an  incentive to embrace such 
targeted remedies.  
 
This political-economy observation somewhat defuses the difficult question whether a 
second-best or even third-best solution which is the financial transaction tax should be 
considered at all before all the more targeted measures have been exhausted. In fact, the 
financial transaction tax might stimulate interest in first-best regulation even as the memory 
of the financial crisis fades.  
 
The targeted first-best measures will of course need to include better regulation and 
supervision of the financial industry. But they may also include more targeted tax incentives. 
For example, it may be possible to measure and to tax systemic risk directly, as suggested for 
example by Acharya et al. (2009). Such levies may, for example, be used to fund a financial-
sector bailout mechanism, as is currently under discussion in Sweden and can be argued to be 
at the heart of the recent Obama proposal to tax large banks based on their leverage.  
 
Even within a financial transaction tax system, differentiation in rates of tax is possible and 
could be a useful means to make the system more targeted and effective. In particular, one 
may wish to consider taxing over-the-counter derivative transactions at a somewhat higher 
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rate than exchange-based derivative transactions.15 Substantively, this could be justified on 
account of the lesser transparency and greater systemic risks that over-the-counter 
transactions might entail. And such tax incentives could nicely complement the ongoing 
legislative action on both sides of the Atlantic to encourage centralised clearing for 
derivatives.  
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